Arabian Nights
As we approached the one-month
mark in Baghdad we often passed the evenings on the roof of our
quarters, it offered a grand view of Baghdad and a small respite
from the long hot days. We tuned the radio to a Iraqi propaganda
broadcast called “Flashes in the Gulf”, we recognized
it for what it was, but it did offer some news of the home front
complete with contemporary music. The rooftop evenings also gave
us insights on the local Iraqis living nearby. We knew the Iraqi
secret police had moved into the house across the street and we
often saw them watching us with binoculars. In the pre dawn
hours, we would observe them picking up our trash. We began a
deception game of placing crudely drawn maps with military
symbols on them in an attempt to deceive the Iraqis on the nature
of the US forces buildup. After several mornings of the neighbor
coming over to pick up our trash, Dewight Durmon a Hawk Missile
Warrant decided to make his job a little easier and began
carrying the trash across the street and depositing it at his
doorstep. We would also occasionally talk with the Iraqi guards
who were young men that appeared very nervous about their job.
Sometimes we would approached a guard, pause and begin looking up
to the sky and pointing, in our poor Arabic we would say
“Shoof-Look” and the guard would ask what are we
looking at? We'd respond “Stealth Plane”. After a few
episodes of this, we would occasionally see the guards walking
their post and pausing every now and then, to look skyward. We
also knew that the phone calls we were permitted to make were
monitored and we all exercised utmost caution and OPSEC when
talking with our families. We knew if they discovered we were
military personnel with diplomatic passports they would take us
into custody.
By mid September, President Bush and Saddam
Hussein had exchanged videotaped addresses to be aired on
television. The US tape arrived via diplomatic pouch courier and
the Charge delivered to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarqi Aziz. We
watched it the following evening on Iraqi television. They first
introduced the tape with a commentary, and then broadcasted it in
its entirety. They followed up with a closing commentary about
how the tape was not supported by any brotherly Arab nations
which were now being forced by the US to allow infidel soldiers
to enter holy Islamic sites and mosques. The day following the
videotape broadcast, Iraqi demonstrators showed up outside the
embassy compound for our routine demonstration. The situation
appeared to be in complete stalemate. Iraq was determined to stop
any coalition building and began offering free oil to any nation
that would stand with them against the US. King Hussein of Jordan
arrived in Baghdad and attempted to gain freedom for the hostages
as a personal favor to President Bush, his efforts failed. The
King of Jordan, with a huge Palestinian population to contend
with, reluctantly gave weak support to Saddam Hussein and
departed Baghdad. With prospects of release growing dimmer every
day we continued our programs of evacuating American citizens,
tracking the Americans who were brought to Baghdad for movement
to Iraqi Strategic sites, devising plans for escape and
continuous building of our food stocks. Iraq announced on 18
September that any foreigners caught violating food rationing
would be hung. Our Charge was enraged at this pronouncement and
immediately prepared and delivered a demarche to the Iraqi
Foreign Ministry. Since the Iraqis were not providing their guest
with any food, the only alternative they had was to use the
black-market to obtain supplies. For us this meant it would
become much more dangerous to obtain food on the local economy.
On 21 September, Iraq declared persona non-gratis
all western Defense attaches. Our COS and COL. Richie, the DAO,
had two days to get out of town. We helped them pack out their
quarters and took all their food stocks. They also carried with
them a wealth of knowledge on our contingency plans and the
situation around Baghdad. We would attempt to fill the gap and
continue efforts to collect HUMINT. CENTCOM was not happy with
any plans of escape and had told us to wait out the situation,
for fear that an escape plan that went wrong would cost lives and
impact any diplomatic efforts. We ceased official plans but
continued to explore options in the event war did break out.
Things also got a little shaky after Iraq had violated the
sovereignty of several western embassies in Kuwait. We prepared
for the possibility that they might attempt to enter the embassy
compound in Baghdad. Again the Iraqis pressed the Charge for
another listing with occupation of all Kuwait embassy personnel
whom were now being housed in the American embassy Baghdad. We
quickly devised a plan to go to other western embassy compounds
in Baghdad if they decided to take us into custody. We still
could not understand why the Iraqis had not figured out that 11
of us were active duty military, our cover continued to hold but
we became increasingly concerned that they would eventually
figure it out and take us into custody. Our President had already
declared us "Hostages" and the Iraqis called us
"guests". All we knew was our situation was tenuous as
best, and we were not being treated like guests, so our best
option was to do our duty and look for a way out should the
inevitable occur.
TAKE THE LONG WAY HOME
By early October 1990, approximately seven UN
Resolutions were in place against Iraq. As always, there are ways
around embargoes, and sanctions. The Iraqis were very resourceful
and showing no signs of weakening. As much as we could observe,
the spoils being brought from Kuwait and the open highway with
Jordan were mitigating the effects of the embargo. We could see
some impact on the economy by the rapid rise in inflation and the
quality of food products. For example, fresh beef and poultry was
becoming harder to find but were still available, although the
quality was somewhat questionable. Many shop keepers told us that
Iraqi diary farms were slaughtering off their herds due to lack
grain and poultry farmers were also slaughtering off their laying
hens for the same reason.
We began sensing nervousness throughout the city.
The US buildup to "Desert Shield" was well underway and
the GOI knew US troop strength and the coalition was rapidly
growing. Hence the Iraqis began preparing the populace for air
attacks by in placing antiaircraft guns on many of the city's
government buildings and occasionally sounding the air raid
sirens. The GOI efforts were not new to the populace, they were
quick to inform us they had been through air, and missile attacks
during the war with Iran. The locals that we spoke with just
would not believe that attacks by the US would be far more
devastating. They had a real mindset that they would survive and
somehow Saddam would protect them.
The GOI also began publicizing how their
"Human Shields" would help protect key strategic sites
and ensure peace. Military checkpoints already present began
showing up randomly throughout the city. Gasoline rationing went
into effect, although there was no shortage of gas, many felt it
was a measure to keep the populace from traveling very far from
Baghdad. Often during the evening hours, while on our rooftop, we
would observe antiaircraft fire and tracers arching upward in the
night skies. It was becoming more difficult to move about Baghdad
and we could tell the Iraqi secret police had doubled their
efforts in surveillance, and stepped up efforts to follow us
around.
While performing watch officer duties on 12
October, I took a call from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA). They requested the Charge immediately come down for a
meeting. I notified the Charge and he proceeded to the Iraqi MFA
to inquire as to why he was being summoned. He was informed by
the MFA that the Government of Iraqi (GOI) took exception to a
Voice of America broadcast which quoted a US diplomatic stating
that Saddam Hussein was insane and they wanted to know what the
US government was going to do about it. The Charge informed them
that he would inquire with DOS to see if the U.S. would issue a
demarche or position on Saddam's sanity. The Charge departed and
we heard nothing else from the GOI or the MFA.
On the diplomatic front pressure was mounting on
the GOI to release all hostages and all diplomats that were
brought from Kuwait and detained in Baghdad. Baghdad's responses
was a demand for all foreigners in Iraq and the 19th Providence
(Kuwait) to immediately come forward and register with the Iraqi
MFA. Our embassy in Baghdad was again requested to provide by
diplomatic note a listing of all personnel being housed in the
embassy and the resident quarters. They claimed a complete
listing was needed to properly process personnel for future
release. The Charge refused to comply, because a note had been
previously provided in September and he knew the Iraqis were
attempting to identify military personnel. Since the crisis began
the GOI never really appeared concern with UN Resolution until
the diplomatic community starting talking about "war
crimes". Once word was leaked to the GOI that UN Resolution
674, "war crimes" was in the works and would soon be
passed, they finally began to talk about possible release of
hostages. This started another round of "Bargaining for
Bodies", as former British Prime Minister Heath came to
Baghdad and other notables from Ramsey Clark to Cat Stevens. We
began working a releasable list of diplomats/US citizens with
medical problems or over age sixty. Finally by 23 October, the
Charge was successful in obtaining release of 12 people from our
group and two from the American citizen's safehavened at Amb.
Glaspie's residence.
As mid October approached, a decision was made at
the national level to implement a plan to get some members of our
group out before hostilities began. I was told in early October
that I was being considered for participation in an exfiltration
operation out of Baghdad. I was concerned because the plan was
only for a handful of people and I did not want to leave my
comrades. I approached COL Mooneyham and asked him why I was
selected, he side stepped the question, but made it clear to me
that I must volunteer and go along with the plan.
Our Kuwait COS devised and coordinate the
operation. The mission was risky and dangerous but offered the
first plan with a reasonable high chance of success. I learned
later that an Escape Committee formed in Washington to review
possible escape plans, rescues, and other methods for retrieving
the trapped diplomats and key personnel. The committee approved
our plan after several meetings and detail reviews. The decision
was finally made to execute the planned escape.
We conducted hurried training and recons of the
pick-up location. The plan was simple, we would have papers, and
documents that indicated we had valid exit visas and had been
released to return home. This was not too irregular, since exit
visas were being granted on case by case bias.
Everything seemed in place. We would be permitted
one small type gym bag to carry a change of clothes, shaving kit,
toothpaste, etc. We also placed in each bag ample cigarettes, and
a few bottles of liquor to be used as pay off to any checkpoint
guards who became too suspicious. After a few trial runs, we
finally got the signal to go. We had setup a system to cover our
absence by staying in the embassy compound for several days
running. I was working a night shift so my absences from our
living quarters would be less obvious to the Iraqi secret police.
The embassy also implemented strict OPSEC and no other members of
our group knew who or when any of us would be leaving. They would
be told a few days after we left. COL Mooneyham had also
prohibited phone calls and DOS messages to be sent until we had
safely made it out of Iraq.
We departed on a cloudy evening with a slight
drizzle coming down. The first leg was our pick-up and trip to a
safe house. Pick-up went without a problem and we headed to a
secure area. Once there we met the people who would assist with
our escape. That night we were given our documents, discussed the
route, possible danger areas, and actions to be taken if we ran
into trouble. About 0500hrs the next morning, we refueled the car
from a 55 gal drum that was stored at secure area. Once out of
Baghdad, we hit our first military checkpoint. Our driver showed
our papers and we were waved through, one down and many more to
go. A lead vehicle had gone ahead of us by several hours to recon
checkpoints and position our refuel point on a barren stretch of
road. We made it to the refuel point by late afternoon and pulled
off the road several kilometers to make our final refuel. While
refueling, an Iraqi Bedouin walked up to our refuel operation. We
quickly began offering him cigarettes and liquor. After a few
minutes of small talk, he wondered off. We had to move quickly
out of fear that he would inform any Iraqi patrols about our
activities or our presence in the area. We headed down the road
for several more miles when our lead vehicle came back and
signaled us to pull over. He had observed the next checkpoint and
noted that the Iraqis were being very tough on vehicles coming
through the checkpoint. We made the decision that everyone would
pretend to be asleep as we went through the checkpoint and let
our guide do all the talking if question. We took some of the
liquor and poured it on our clothes and around the car’s
interior. Our driver would explain that we had all passed out
from drinking too much in celebration of returning home. When we
reach the checkpoint, the guards took our papers. After five
minutes they returned and instructed our driver to get out of the
car. He broke out some cigarettes and started small talk in
Arabic with the guards, after a few laughs they told him he could
leave, but he should not allow drinking and driving. He thanked
them in the profusely Arabic manner and we quickly departed.
As we closed on the crossing area, our lead
vehicle appeared again. We pulled over and were told that the
Iraqi customs agent were being very thorough and confirming all
exit visas with Baghdad. This was a huge disappointment. Our
friends had already patterned the crossing area, but as always
"Murphy" hits when least expected. We had now gone too
far to turn back. We knew our papers and documentation were good
and had worked through many checkpoints, but this crossing area
would be much tougher. We all discussed the options and decided
again to try pretending to have drunk too much and let our escort
do the all the talking. We would act somewhat intoxicated and not
respond if questioned. We would wait for our escort to intervene
and handle the situation.
As we pulled into the checkpoint area, we were
instructed to get out of the car and submit our bags for
inspection. Since the custom officials spoke little English, we
pretended not to understand them when they spoke to us. As
expected they confiscated what cigarettes and liquor we had left
and then moved us to a building. As suspected, they wanted to
confirm with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Baghdad
that our exit visas were still valid. The Iraqis all through this
crisis would sometimes issue exit visa and then revoke them at
the last minute. This perhaps was one of the most dangerous
periods of our journey, had the Iraqis decided to interrogate us
we would have been exposed and imprisoned. Furthermore, traveling
under this cover would probably have gotten us all a death
sentence. Our luck held and we endured the wait with extreme high
anxiety. Our guide handled all the talking and after almost an
hour of waiting they finally agreed to allow us to pass. We would
have to walk across no man's land. Our guide would have to leave
and since he was not allowed to escort us across. We picked up
our bags and headed across. About a fourth of the way into the no
man's land, an Iraqi guard called out for us to halt. We were not
sure if they had changed their minds. We thought about making a
dash for it, but we quickly realized we could not outrun their
automatic weapons. We halted and the Iraqi guard approached me
and asked for a cigarette, I more that willingly handed him a
fresh pack and gestured for him to keep it, he nodded and
motioned us on.
We stepped into freedom after some 80 days of
detention. Two more guides linked up with us and would transport
us to another location. We would retain our cover and travel
incognito. The escape would not be publicized or revealed at
anytime, so as not to expose anyone that assisted us, and not
spoil any other planned exfiltrations.
Our next leg would be a journey to link-up with US
officials. After a three-days of travel, we finally left for the
United States aboard an USAF Gulf stream II jetliner. Once in the
US we were taken to Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Va. Upon
arrival there, our wives or family members were present to greet
us. After a few days at Camp Peary for debriefings, we were
released to go home.
I finally returned home without fanfare and just
glad the ordeal was done. I still had great apprehension over
leaving behind my friends and comrades. Nevertheless, our test of
this potential pipeline to get folks out had proved viable.
Before any others could be brought out via the same method, the
GOI had a change of heart and allowed all western hostages to
begin departing Iraq and Kuwait in early December. By mid
December, the embassies in Kuwait, and Baghdad closed and all
remaining hostages were freed by the GOI. The Baghdad embassy
remains closed to this day and the American Embassy Kuwait was
reopened in early March 1991 shortly after the ground war ended.
As a military officer caught up in an invasion and
hostage situation the most difficult task was ensuring my
family's safety while duty bound to perform the task I had been
trained to do. Once family members were allowed to leave that
conflict was resolved. All that I served with during this crisis
performed with dedication, professionalism, and distinction, even
when caught between two masters, DOS, and DoD. It is my belief
that the military group serving at the U.S. Embassy Kuwait and
subsequently at the embassy in Baghdad had a direct and positive
influence in sustaining and maintaining the operations of those
compounds, perhaps more so than any other group detained within
those compounds. Our contributions to morale, welfare, logistics,
and day to day operations help to ensure the national goals and
objectives were meet in regards to operating a diplomatic post
during a time of crisis.
After everyone returned, we all faced the task of
putting our lives back together and dealing the total loss of our
household goods. The Army required that we go through the
standard claims procedure to account for our losses, this was a
daunting task and took us nearly a year to complete the paper
work, only to realize that almost everything we had was
depreciated on the average of 40%. Most of us got duty stations
of our choice and nearly 30 days of administrative leave to get
our families and lives back in order.
By January 1991, some of us were asked to return
to Desert Shield. Of the original group of 11 military 5 of us
returned to help the Kuwaitis reconstitute their Armed Forces,
but that's another story. Prior to my return, my local hometown
paper interviewed me. During the interview I was asked how long a
ground war with Iraqi would last, I ponder the question for a few
seconds and then respond based on my first hand observations of
the vaunted Republican Guards. I first told the reporter that I
had no respect for the Iraqi Army, then provided this response:
"If war breaks out, I expect it to last
about two weeks, I think our Air power would be decisive enough
to turn the Iraqis around and convince them it's a hopeless
cause. His Air Force would be gone in a day or two…I think
after our Air power finished, they would largely begin to
capitulate, to surrender, or withdraw their forces. Our ground
forces would then be in a mop-up operation, not heavy combat
actions. Either now or later Saddam must be dealt with, I would
think he would heed the lesson for a while, but continue either
clandestinely or however obtaining nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons…if he remains in power… You will see
him raise his ugly head again". (6 January 1991).
This was what all of us had summarized after
witnessing the invasion and conduct of the Republican Guards.
When we all returned no one in the military intelligence
community wanted to hear that or believe that was true. We knew
better from direct observation and interaction with Iraqi
military. Lastly, if anyone had bothered to do any superficial
research of the performance of the Republican Guards during the
Iran/Iraq war they would quickly summarize that they were a large
fourth rate Army that was poorly led and trained.
I hope that some useful insights can be gained
from this document and serve as a history of a small military
organization caught-up in a world crisis.
USLOK MEMBERS
2 August - 10 December 1990
Military
Col John Mooneyham
LTC Tom Funk
LTC Rhoi Maney
Maj Fred Hart
CPT Bill Schultz
CW4 Dave Forties
CW3 Dwight Durmon
CW3 Gene Lord
MSG Alfred Allen
SFC Laruen Vellekoop
CPO Ray Galles
USMC Embassy Detachment
GYSGT Jim Smith
SGT Gerald Andre
CPL Dan Hudson
CPL Paul Rodriguez
CPL Mark Royer
CPL Mark Ward
Civilians (DoD)
Veron Nored
Wayne Coyne
Bobby Higgins
page 3 of 3
If you would care to email the
author
Colonel Fred Hart